As part of the UNA-USA Annual Meeting on 10 June 2006, two nuclear weapons experts with differing views revealed their crystal ball predictions for the future of nuclear weapons and their recommendations to increase the utility and legitimacy of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The session featured Leonard Spector, Deputy Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and Randy Rydell, Senior Fellow at the Arms Control Association. After presentations by each speaker, Ambassador Jonathan Dean moderated an open discussion.

Notes

Remarks by Leonard Spector

Leonard Spector felt that more acknowledgment needs to be given to the success of decreased stockpiles of nuclear weapons. He predicted that this trend is likely to continue because the United Kingdom may reconsider maintaining its weapon stockpiles when its nuclear submarines are refurbished in the near future. The UK's destruction of stockpiles may be mitigated by China's retention and perhaps expansion of its program, which China is modernizing.

The classic tools to restrain nuclear proliferation continue to be effective and sufficient for the future, not withstanding a few challenges. He referenced and discussed a chart of nuclear weapon states since 1945. Fifty years ago, three states had nuclear weapons: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. Since then, the number of nuclear-weapon states has increased, but not dramatically, particularly given the nearly 200 countries in the world. Indeed, the number of states stabilized over the past two decades at nine nuclear-weapon states, with Libya and North Korea changing places as the ninth state. Even with 9/11, al-Qaeda, the Iraq War, and the A.Q. Khan network, the world still only has nine nuclear-weapon states today.

He attributed the success with Libya to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a United States initiative introduced by President Bush on 31 May 2003. When introduced, some countries criticized the PSI for the insinuated pre-emptive strike policy, its implications on the definition of state sovereignty, and the role of the PSI in weakening international law. Cuba expressed concern that implementation of some PSI actions could violate international laws, such as the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

In addition to the PSI, two other new anti-proliferation tools help augment the traditional tools: UNSCR 1540 and Executive Order 13382. The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 requires action by all states to criminalize WMD proliferation and to enact legal and regulatory measures to strengthen licensing, export controls, and security of sensitive materials. Executive Order 13382 of June 28, 2005 blocks property of WMD proliferants.

Spector made predictions on North Korea, Iran/Iraq, and the number of NWS in 2010.

• North Korea
  North Korea appears supportive of the U.S. incentive package to freeze its nuclear arsenal and to eliminate it under the 1953 Agreed Framework.
  
  
• Iran and Iraq
  Both Iran and Iraq may "well be thwarted" in their attempts to develop nuclear weapons.
  
  
• Number of Nuclear-Weapon States in 2010
  This prediction came with a graph, showing the outcome of two scenarios: one where the Bush administration's diplomacy succeeds and the other where the diplomacy fails. The graph looked the same under both scenarios, with a range of 8-11 nuclear-weapon states in the world in 2010. The wild cards of uncertainty included a coup in Pakistan, a breakdown within the Iranian nuclear chain of command, and theft from Russia.
  
  

Remarks by Randy Rydell

Randy Rydell listed potential goals of the term "nuclear non-proliferation" to demonstrate the diversity of viewpoints in the room and in the world.

Is the goal of nuclear non-proliferation to:

• Limit the number of nuclear weapons in the world;
• Limit the capacity of nuclear weapons;
• Ban targeting civilians with nuclear weapons;
• Slow the rate of nuclear weapons production; or
• Eliminate nuclear weapons under Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? See my blog on NPT Article 6.

The definition of non-proliferation alters the policy and legal approaches to addressing nuclear weapons. Attention is given largely to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. He would like to see equal attention given to existing stockpiles, the spread of nuclear weapons, and the threats by non-state actors.

While nuclear weapons warrant attention, the collective global community needs to support effective and adequate management of all three types of weapons of mass destruction: 1) biological weapons, 2) chemical weapons, and 3) nuclear weapons. For all these are destructive in nature, regardless of whose hands command them.

Rydell made recommendations and predictions on the NPT, North Korea, Iran, and South Asia.

• NPT
  To be effective, the NTP needs to have a standing body with a Secretariat. A permanent office could reduce delays in information exchange and could facilitate the organization of special sessions to tackle emerging threats.
  
  
• North Korea
  The United States should rely on the previous Korean War Armistice Agreement of 1953. Compare with Dr. William E. Berry, Jr., a professor of military strategic studies at the US Air Force Academy, who feels that the 1953 Agreement is outdated and needs to be replaced. See my earlier blog.
  
  
• Iran
  Iran should be encouraged to follow Egypt's lead and embrace the proposal for a nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East. As a success model, Egypt continues to develop its civilian nuclear industry. Similarly, Iran could continue peaceful applications of nuclear energy, under appropriate IAEA safeguards.
  
  
• South Asia: India and Pakistan
  Peace is not a prerequisite to achieve fissile cut-off and support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  
  

The panelists fielded six questions from the attendees during the moderated discussion. Each question prompted multiple responses. Three answers are worth highlighting.

1. Ban Highly Enriched Uranium
Rydell argued that all highly enriched uranium should be banned based on nuclear weapons proliferation concerns. He argued that the inherent security threats cannot be solved through export controls or technology. For example, A.Q. Khan worked at a centralized, multinational facility, which was established, in part, to increase security by reducing the number of people and places involved in advanced fuel cycle production yet those safeguards failed. A.Q. Khan became involved in clandestine proliferation activities.

2. Creation of Fifth Nuclear-Free Zone by End of 2006
Rydell stated that a fifth nuclear weapon-free zone, the first zone entirely north of the equator, could be adopted by the end of 2006. Five Central Asian states -- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan -- agreed to the draft text of the treaty in 2002.

The existing four nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ) include:

• Latin America and the Caribbean under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which entered into force on 22 April 1968.
• South Pacific under the Treaty of Rarotonga, which entered into force on December 11, 1986.
• Southeast Asia under the Bangkok Treaty, which was signed on December 15, 1995.
• Africa under the Pelindaba Treaty, which opened for signatures on April 11, 1996.

Note: He did not include agreements banning nuclear weapons in Antarctica, Mongolia, or Germany.

3. Reasons for Hope
Spector concluded on a pragmatic and optimistic note. With a smile, he asserted that negotiations are possible.

Remaining Questions

With questions exceeding the time available, my following questions remained unasked:

• Can we expect irreversible, unilateral reductions in nuclear weapons?
• Are security assurances essential preconditions for nuclear cooperation?
• With Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), publicly estimating an 15-20 additional nuclear-weapon states, do countries feel his statements effectively authorize new attempts to enrich uranium?
• What are their thoughts on the US-India nuclear agreement?

The Future of Nuclear Weapons Issue Session

• Arms Control Association
• Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies
• United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA)

2005 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference

• 2005 NPT RevCon Conference Documents
• 2005 NPT RevCon Preparatory Committee First Session Documents (PrepCom 1) (2002)
• 2005 NPT RevCon Preparatory Committee Second Session Documents (PrepCom 2) (2003)
• 2005 NPT RevCon Preparatory Committee Third Session Documents (PrepCom 3) (2004)

Previous NPT Review Conferences

• 2000 NPT RevCon Final Document
• 1995 NPT RevCon Final Decisions and Resolution

Additional Resources - Nuclear Treaties United Nations

• UN and Disarmament
• UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (28 April 2004)
• International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on nuclear weapons (8 July 1996)
• International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on nuclear weapons (4 November 1999)
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
• International Maritime Organization (IMO)

Additional Resources - Organizations

• Arms Control Association
• Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies
• Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)
• Arms Control Association
• ArmsControlWonk.com Blog
• Campaign to Strengthen the NPT (Arms Control Association and the Carnegie Endowment)
• Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP)
• Nuclear Control Institute (NCI)
• Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)