SÃ¸ren Jessen-Petersen, the former Head of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK 2004-2006), spoke in Washington, D.C. this summer on challenges faced by UN missions. Currently, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) oversees 18 peacekeeping missions, employs more than 110,000 troops, and manages a budget of $7.2 billion, up from $2.7 billion in 2001, just for peacekeeping. In addition, the budget for political and peacebuilding missions has increased to more than $253 million annually, up from $37.1 million in 2002, according to the Secretary-General’s Report, U.N. Doc. A/60/696 (Feb. 24, 2006).

With these dramatic increases, stakeholders seek reassurances that these investments in peace and global security are cost-effective and produce results. Further, these dramatic increases raise the question of whether the expansion of peacekeeping is primarily a consequence of the failure of diplomacy, of international or local institutions, of governance, or other factors. Also, some stakeholders are concerned that continued expansion of UN missions may result in decreased overall effectiveness as financial, logistical, and human resources are spread too thin.

With respect to international institutional response, Jessen-Petersen identified four gaps in UN peacekeeping operations that are limiting their effectiveness: (1) mandate gaps, (2) humanitarian action versus reconstruction goals, (3) allocation of resources and capacity building, and (4) implementation gaps in restoring human rights and the rule of law. Notably, he did not include the gender gap in peacekeeping and peacebuilding as recognized in Security Council Resolution 1325, constraints to intervention under the UN Charter, or the UN’s ability to discipline international troops.

The Four Gaps: Challenges to UN Peacekeeping Operations

SÃ¸ren Jessen-Petersen
Image linked from UNMIK.

The following summarizes his speech.

Gap 1: UN Mission Mandate Gaps
Here, there are gaps between the root causes of the conflict and the subsequent mandate given to the UN Mission. There is a difference between the pragmatic and theoretical outcome goals, and these gaps can be seen in the realities of what professionals and troops experience on the ground.

In Kosovo, Security Council Resolution 1244 authorized the mandate of UNMIK. The mandate contained major contradictions. First, it stopped the conflict but neither addressed the root causes of the conflict nor addressed why there was intervention by the coalition of the willing to stop the brutal oppression. Second, the status was deferred. Third, the resolution recognized the territorial integrity of then-Yugoslavia, but, at the same time, the resolution suspended the authority of Yugoslavia over Kosovo. Instead, the resolution vested that authority in UNMIK. The resolution ordered UNMIK to promote self-governing institutions but did not provide clarity on what the outcome was supposed to be or to what end. Those uncertainties led to unplanned outcomes.

He raised the following questions: Is preparation for statehood inconsistent with the mandate? Is handing over elements of governance to local authorities inconsistent with the mandate?

Gap 2: Humanitarian Action versus Redevelopment/Reconstruction
This gap contains three elements: (1) institutional gap, (2) funding gap, and (3) timing gap.
Institutional gap means that humanitarian actors and development actors have different work methods. Humanitarian actors tend to act quickly. Development actors tend to be “thorough.” Second, funding gaps between immediate post-conflict and long-term needs. Funding tends to decrease when the need for development and reconstruction increases. Thus, funding does not match the needs. Third, timing favors introduction of humanitarian actors immediately and for quick, short periods of time. Sometimes, the humanitarian actors leave before the development actors.

Gap 3: Resources and Capacity Building
There is a difference between international and local actors and allocation of resources. Capacity building requires translating the resources to address local needs in a coordinated way. At times, the international actors act for their “own sake” rather than local needs.

Gap 4: Human Rights, Sources of Conflict, and Rule of Law
This gap tracks back to mandate gaps because the mandates offer little guidance on how to reestablish rule of law. The structural gap means that these activities are delayed or ineffective. Planning for rule of law very often seems to have been an afterthought, and, as a result, the activities are implemented very late. Such late timing can hamper, if not destroy, the opportunities to establish rule of law. Further, implementation of rule of law requires expertise, but such expertise frequently is not available when needed. A very serious gap in implementation includes the ability to address displaced peoples and land and property issues. In Kosovo, it took four years to address property issues and thus delayed reconciliation.

We know that legal advice from the international institutions or higher institutions may be slow in coming. Still, practitioners face practical gaps on the ground that need to be addressed.

A Few Additional Gaps

The following are a few additional gaps that came to mind.

Gender Gap: Women’s Participation in Peace Operations and Post-Conflict Reconstruction
In 2000, the UN Secretary-General encouraged expansion of women in UN Missions and the incorporation of mechanisms for women. That same year, Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1325 on 31 October 2000 as the first resolution to specifically address the impact of war on women, and women’s contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable peace. The historic resolution urged increased women in peacekeeping missions, appointment of more women by the Secretary-General, and “where appropriate” to incorporate a gender component in field operations.

As of March 2008, women constituted 2% of DPKO peacekeeping troops, and eleven of the 18 UN peacekeeping missions had a gender adviser. One woman currently leads a peace operation as a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and three women serve as Deputy SRSGs.

In 2007, India supplied the first all-women contingent to serve in a peacekeeping mission, a Formed Police Unit (FPU), to the UN operation in Liberia.

Intervention Authorization Gap: State Sovereignty and Humanitarian Emergencies
There is a gap between international accountability for egregious crimes and state sovereignty when a crisis occurs or a crime is committed solely within the boundaries of a sovereign state. The proponents of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) advocate for early intervention before a situation escalates to mass atrocities and to have the right of coercive international intervention in an uncooperative state when mass human rights violations are occurring.

Affirmative legal authority under international law to intervene in state affairs without consent historically has been constrained under the UN Charter by the principle of state sovereignty and the prohibition against coercive force subject to two exceptions: self-defense in response to an armed attack and authorization from the Security Council under the Chapter VII powers in response to a threat to international peace and security after the exhaustion of all peaceful means. Chapter VII grants authority to the Security Council to determine the existence of a threat and to decide what measures are to be taken in response to the threat.

The presumption of nonintervention under article 2(7) of the UN Charter historically has precluded coercive intervention in solely domestic affairs, even for egregious state conduct, in the absence of state consent. However, recent experiences with the genocide in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, and crimes against humanity in domestic conflicts from East Timor to Angola have “shocked the conscience” of the international community, prompting the UN Secretary-General in 1999 to challenge world leaders to rethink human security and the Charter’s principles of human rights and nonintervention in the context of a new era of collective responsibility. The Secretary-General emphasized that prior humanitarian interventions in domestic crises under Security Council Chapter VII powers occurred with state consent or the elements of consent in situations of failed states, such as Yugoslavia. His call for rationales to broaden the criteria for intervention, to define limitations on state sovereignty, and to identify where the Security Council should act in defense of “common humanity” sparked moral and legal debates, as well as efforts to develop standards for international humanitarian intervention without state consent. The international community remains divided on the legality of unilateral humanitarian interventions along a spectrum: unlawful, unlawful but morally excusable, justifiable under customary law, and lawful.

Accountability Gap: UN Peacekeepers and Discipline
Currently, the UN does not have the legal means to force any troop contributing country to punish improper behavior of their nationals when that behavior is committed during an UN mission. The UN and DPKO rely solely on political persuasion. Thus, the DPKO leaves it up to the troop-contributing country to discipline, adjudicate, and/or punish unlawful actions committed by peacekeeping troops. The UN can deport the personnel. Victims, however, are not assured any sense of justice. Further, the absence of disciplinary measures does not promote deterrence. Thus, the current system is premised on proactive training and voluntary compliance with ethical and lawful conduct by troops in the field.

Two examples of troops deported from UN missions include Sri Lanka personnel in Haiti and Moroccans in the Ivory Coast. According to the DPKO, the Sri Lankans are facing “judicial action,” but the process is very lengthy.

Frequently Asked Questions

1. Does the UN have its own military?
No. The UN depends on troop and financial contributions from the 192-member states. Article 43 requires to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and to assist with providing “armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” If the Security Council decides to use force and requests assistance from a member state, Article 44 allows that state to choose to participate in the decisions of the Security Council in matters concerning the deployment of that state’s armed forces.

2. How many UN peacekeeping missions have there been?
As of 2008, the UN has authorized 63 UN peacekeeping operations.

3. How many countries contribute to UN peacekeeping missions?
As of March 2008, 118 countries have contributed military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations.

4. What was the first peacekeeping operation?
The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East was authorized in May 1948.

5. What’s the longest current peacekeeping operation?
The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East is both the first peacekeeping operation and the longest currently active mission.

Of interest, nine of the current peacekeeping missions began prior to 2000: India/Pakistan UNMOGIP (1949); Cyprus UNFICYP (1964); Syria UNDOF (1974); Lebanon UNIFIL (1978); Western Sahara MINURSO (1991); Georgia UNOMIG (1993); and the Democratic Republic of Congo MONUC (1999).

6. Which countries contribute the most uniformed personnel?
Pakistan (10.5k), Bangladesh(9k), and India (9k) are the top three contributors of uniformed troops, followed by Nigeria (5k), Nepal(3.5k), and Ghana(3k).

7. Which countries contribute the most money for peacekeeping?
As a percentage of assessed contributions, the United States (26%), Japan (17%), and Germany (9%) are the top three contributors, followed by the United Kingdom (8%), France(7%), and Italy (5%).

Resources

UN Missions Online

Women in Peacekeeping Resources

May 29

International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers