Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty – RevCon

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) being held at the UN headquarters in New York began without an agenda because member states could not reach agreement on which substantive issues to discuss and the rules of procedure. The treaty members could not even agree on whether to discuss the major events which have occurred since their last meeting: the first withdrawal from the treaty by a member state, the IAEA report on Iran’s violations of the treaty, the uncovering of an international nuclear smuggling network, and the budget proposals by the United States Department of Defense to expand its armaments to include “nuclear bunker buster” bombs. The only consensus seems to be a lack of political confidence in the effectiveness of the treaty, particularly in its ability to shield the world from nonproliferation and to legally bind nuclear weapon states to disarmament. After the delegates concur on an agenda, the challenge of the month-long conference will be to achieve agreement on the larger task of reform.

Disarmament – Is the “Principle of Irreversibility” Reversible?
At the last review, NPT RevCon 2000, nuclear weapon states unanimously agreed to a 13-part plan outlining the “principle of irreversibility” as applied to nuclear disarmament. Previously, the five nuclear nations were bound to pursue good-faith negotiations to disarm but without any specific measures (Article VI). Thus, the plan transformed the vague goal of ultimate disarmament into enforceable obligations. However, since NPT RevCon 2000, emergent global risks associated with terrorism networks, rogue nations, and weapons of mass destruction have challenged governments to rethink the fundamental issues of nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and legitimate uses of nuclear technologies embodied in the treaty. Most notably, nuclear weapon states have shifted dialogue away from the elimination of nuclear weapons and towards the containment of nuclear technologies by others, stirring concerns among the non-nuclear states of a return to the nuclear arms race the treaty is supposed to combat.

Article VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty
on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.

The Right to Nuclear Energy
In return for promised action on disarmament by nuclear weapon states as part of the 13-point plan, non-nuclear weapon states agreed to forego advanced nuclear fuel cycle facilities with a concomitant reliance on “reasonably priced” fuel supplies from nuclear weapon states. The non-nuclear states saw this as a political choice, rather than as a mandate by the nuclear weapon states, and thus, consistent with the “inalienable right” to peaceful uses of nuclear technologies guaranteed in the treaty (Article IV).

Article IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

Then, just a few days before NPT RevCon 2005 began, the US previewed its position on new restrictions governing the rights to use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. For instance, the US pre-agenda outlined mandatory precondition IAEA safeguards, a complete ban on fuel cycle facility proliferation, limits to dual-use reactors, and strengthened enforcement measures. Moreover, the US asserted that since Iran was noncompliant with inspections required in Article I and Article II, Iran no longer had the right to possess any nuclear technologies, even those used for the peaceful purposes guaranteed by Article IV. The US called for a complete cessation and elimination of nuclear energy by Iran, claiming, “Iran has no legitimate need for this technology.”

To the non-nuclear weapon states, these US-proposed conditions represent a potential infringement on sovereign states’ rights as guaranteed by the treaty and hence, by international law. Some states, such as Iran, perceive such limitations as arbitrary and mandated by the few states with nuclear weapons. In addition, the United States remains noncompliant with its required nuclear disarmament commitments yet there is no enforceable penalty or proposed restrictions on the US.

Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

“Terror Alerts” Up, Compliance Rates Down
To irreversibly eliminate nuclear weapons, the need for responsive force to weapons of mass destruction needs to be eliminated. Yet in recent years, the number of terrorists acts and the magnitude of these acts have increased rather than decreased. Moreover, three known nuclear powers, India, Pakistan, and Israel, have acquired nuclear capabilities outside the constraints of the treaty and North Korea has announced its intention to do so in defiance of the treaty. In the face of modern WMDs, nuclear weapons continue to provide the ultimate asymmetrical bargaining chip. Thus, as long as there remains a lack of universal disarmament with transparent and verified results, states will feel a tension between national security strategies and treaty compliance.

Power Through Nukes or Rule of Law?
For the treaty to be effective, the power of the rule of law must be recognized and usable on the international level, and it must be enforceable. North Korea was able to withdraw from the treaty in 2003 without recourse because the treaty does not specify any penalties. Likewise, states have been able to violate IAEA standards for extended periods without penalties or restrictions. To strengthen the treaty’s credibility and restore genuine effective multilateral compliance, states have suggested stronger enforcement measures, mandatory compliance standards, modifications to Article II to lower the threshold for what constitutes nuclear weapon development, and additional protocols to the treaty obliging all states to take specific steps to control nonproliferation.

What’s Not Seen – Universality
Transparency and verification are absent as plumes of whites smokes remain missing from the Yongbyon nuclear reactor in North Korea. Likewise, the historical lack of transparency and IAEA compliance by Iran continues to fuel speculation on that country’s nuclear aspirations and activities.

Moreover, no multilateral treaty related to nuclear weapon control is universally accepted. The signatures of three nuclear weapon states, India, Pakistan, and Israel, are missing from the NPT treaty. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) lacks commitment from India, Pakistan, North Korea, and the United States. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) is no longer effective since the United States withdrew in 2001. Additionally, of the Big-5 NPT nuclear weapon states, the United States has failed to sign the three protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which binds these nuclear states to a commitment not to use, test, or transport nuclear explosive devices in the zone.

At a time when governments need to provide a unified plan of action on the control and nonproliferation of nuclear technologies, global community consensus, like the agenda, is notably absent.
This dissension contributes to a lack of confidence in the “universality” of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Yet, even if the member states fail to agree on an agenda or a final consensus decision, NPT RevCon 2005 still serves a vital role in enhancing global security through its role as a communication channel for the facilitation of information and intelligence sharing among nations.

Background on Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

• Entry into Force – 5 March 1970

• Goals –
The main goals of the treaty include the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the ultimate disarmament of all nuclear weapons worldwide. The treaty is the only multilateral treaty to obligate nuclear weapon states to disarm.

• Parties to the Treaty –
All UN member states, with the exception of India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, are party to the treaty. North Korea withdrew in 2003 without recourse since there is no penalty for withdrawal specified by the treaty. Non-nuclear Cuba is also not a party to the treaty. The treaty narrowly defines nuclear weapon states to be only those five states with nuclear capabilities prior to 1 January 1967: the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, and Russia. The treaty legally binds these nuclear weapon states to nuclear disarmament. India, Pakistan, and Israel would need to demonstrate nuclear disarmament before acceding to the treaty.

• Review Conference –
The Review Conference is held every five years, as specified in the treaty (Article VIII (3)). The conference is advisory.

Resources on Nuclear Arms Control

2005 NPT Review Conference

Previous NPT Review Conferences

Additional Resources – Nuclear Treaties

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs)

Antarctica Treaty (eif: 3 June 1961)
Rarotonga Treaty / South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (6 August 1985)
Tlatelolco Treaty / Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (LANWFZ) (1967)
Bangkok Treaty / Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) (1995)
African Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (ANWFZ) (1996)
Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (CANWFZ) (draft)

Multilateral Treaties

Partial Test Ban Treaty / Nuclear Test Ban Treaty / Limited Test Ban Treaty (eif: 10 October 1963)
Outer Space Treaty (eif: October 1967)
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) (eif: 5 March 1970)
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) (3 October 1972)
Seabed Treaty (eif: 18 May 1972)
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (entry into force 8 February 1987)
Moscow Treaty (24 May 2002; ends 31 Dec 2012)
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (anticipated entry into force)
International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (opens for signatures September 2005)
US Proliferation Security Initiative (defined by the US as an “activity”, not a treaty or organization)
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) (proposed)

United Nations

Additional Resources – Organizations