Iraq – Another Opportunity?
Yesterday, the Iraq Council of Representatives voted 127-0 (148 absent) in favor of reexamining the constitution, an important and symbolic step towards Jonathan Morrow’s prediction of an “inevitably federal Iraq.” The vote comes after a crucial constitutional compromise on Sunday. In closed-door negotiations among the major political parties, the Sunni Arabs, who previously opposed federalism because of fears of a partitioned society and lack of access to petroleum wealth, agreed to support legislation implementing federalism under Article 118 in exchange for the ability to craft a constitutional amendment under Article 142. The Sunni Arab’s goal is to constrain constitutionally the extent of regional autonomy under federalism and thereby reduce the risks of regional self-rule, regional economic disparities, and social fragmentation in Iraq’s ethnically heterogeneous society. In the next step, the Iraqi parliament today will name 27 members to a Constitutional Amendment Committee and will begin debate on the proposed Federalism Bill.
The following three points are discussion points for my class tomorrow – an academic exercise to examine the pragmatic and theoretical aspects of establishing the rule of law in a post-conflict environment through the constitution-making process.
1. International Actors Control of Post-Conflict Outcomes
The assumption in post-conflict situations is that international actors play a role in post-conflict situations; however, no model or theory has defined clearly the appropriate scope of that role. Morrow argues both for the need for international actors and the need to limit their influence. To the latter point, he argues the United States impeded reform in Iraq by inappropriately shaping the available choices for domestic political actors, distributing incentives to change the political influence of certain minorities, and truncating the constitution-making process.
To what extent can international actors control post-conflict outcomes through institutional structures, constitution-making processes, incentives, and external political pressure? While there is no “one size fits all” approach to the role of international actors, should there be limits recognized by the international community as a pragmatic means to avoid damaging actions?
2. Timelines – static versus “adaptive and dynamic”
Exactly three years ago today, Colin Powell ardently defended the six-month timeline for constitution-making in Iraq before the United Nations. Powell explained that the deadline would provide “a sense of momentum and purpose.” To the press, he stated that the timeline would be “a difficult deadline to meet, but we’ve got to get them going.” Notably, France criticized the six-months as too long and proposed a one-month timeline.
Morrow concludes that the United States failed to achieve the strategic goal of promoting political compromise through a sense of urgency and ultimately caused the loss of an opportunity. For Iraq’s second chance at a constitutional compromise, the Iraqi parliament has established a timeline of one year for the constitution-amendment process and eighteen months after enactment for the implementation of federalism.
Will this extended timeline be sufficient to achieve interethnic consensus, civic participation, and public education? If the timeline proves insufficient, how should the domestic political actors prioritize the activities? Just as too little time truncates communication and negotiations, are there dangers of having too much time or flexible deadlines?
3. Judicial Reform
Even as the parliament reconsiders the constitution and federalism, the second-chance efforts overlook judicial reform, is establishment of the rule of law in Iraq equally predicated on reform of the judiciary to ensure the enforcement of the substantive reforms of human rights and women’s rights granted in the constitution?