US Military Strategist on North Korean Nuclear Weapons
Dr. William E. Berry, Jr., a professor of military strategic studies at the US Air Force Academy, addressed an audience of 40 last night in Denver, Colorado. The topic for the evening was “North Korean Nuclear Weapons: A Conundrum Wrapped in an Enigma or Rational Choice?” His hour-long speech sought to achieve three goals: a) to examine the motivations and influences behind North Korea’s nuclear program, b) to explore potential US strategic responses, and c) to identify recommended political, economic, and military actions for the Bush administration. Dr. Berry concluded that regardless of the motivation, military options are not viable solutions to end North Korea’s aggressive stance or to deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. He advocated a solution that incorporates economic incentives and a new legal instrument to replace the outdated Korean War Armistice Agreement of 1953. During the question and answer period, he criticized the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty for its lack of punitive measures against member states that unilaterally withdraw from the treaty, as North
Korea legally did in 2003 without recourse. Jim Butterworth, who led a discussion on North Korean refugees and human rights on 28 April 2005 at the US Capitol, was in attendance and voiced his agreement with Dr. Berry’s assessment.
- Internal worldview: What are the internal influences on the national security objectives and interests of North Korea?
- External worldview: What are the external influences and threats vital to understanding how North Korea approaches national security objectives?
- Bush administration: How effective are the current political, economic, and military strategies?
- South Korea: How has the US relationship with South Korea changed and in what ways do those changes influence the formulation of security objectives?
- Rational choice? Is North Korea acting rationally in response to threats? Should the US act with military force to eliminate security instability on the Korean peninsula?
Background
North Korea, officially known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), has proven to be one of the least understood and most disconcerting regimes in the world, causing wide speculation on whether its actions to become a de facto nuclear weapon state are motivated by a perceived need to possess an insurance policy for regime survival or by a desire to possess a stronger bargaining chip to be negotiated away for larger economic and security concessions. How the US responds depends on the type of motivation.
Kim Jong Il, the “Dear Leader” of North Korea since 1994, inherited a legacy of nuclear ambitions from his father Kim Il Song , the “Great Leader.” Kim Il Song commenced his rule in 1948, three years after the first military use of nuclear weapons by the United States on Japan in 1945. Whether Kim Jong Il perceives the value of nuclear weapons as a deterrent versus bargaining chip appears to be intentionally uncertain, commonly referred to by analysts as “purposeful ambiguity.”
Internal Worldview
North Korea’s leadership has pursued a policy of extreme national self-reliance, known as Juche in Korean, in sharp contrast to the classical economic model of comparative advantage which relies on free trade as an essential component of growth. The combination of self-reliance and poor natural resources led to economic decline while increasing the country’s vulnerability to natural disasters and insufficient agricultural productivity. During the 1990s, an estimated 2 million North Koreans died from malnutrition and famine-related
maladies, mainly associated with flooding.
External Worldview
Dr. Berry identified the collapse of the Soviet Union and relations with China and Russia as the most important factors influencing North Korea’s “external worldview.”
Worldview – Geography
While not specifically mentioned by Dr. Berry, geography has a formative effect on North Korea’s worldview, both internal and external. Korea is located in a strategic position as a geographic barrier between China and Japan. As a result, the country has endured numerous invasions by multiple
foreign powers over the span of 4,000 years. In the past 100 years, Korea has endured five major occupations and four major
wars. At the turn of the century, Korea was forced to defend itself against the regional ambitions of Japan, China, and Russia, and, when unsuccessful, forced to submit to foreign military occupation and unwanted reliance upon a foreign power for critical state functions. Thus, geographical location has played an important role in shaping the nation’s ancient history, its rich culture, and the self-reliance policies adopted since the end of a unified Korea nearly 50 years ago.
Bush administration:
The Bush administration was said to have two competing strategies for dealing with North Korea: tough unilateral aggression to evoke fear and compliance versus diplomatic engagement. The lack of a consistent and unified message has created an atmosphere conducive to misunderstandings of US actions and rhetoric as perceived by the North Korean regime.
While there continues to be disagreement within the ranks, the dominant strategy of “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear weapon program is supported by strong rhetoric from top level US officials, including President Bush. For example, in 2002, US President Bush deemed North Korea as part of the “axis of
evil” in his State of the Union Address. That same year, the US adopted a national security strategy of preemptive strike against rogue states supporting terrorism, specifically mentioning North Korea as a potential target. During a press conference on 28 April 2005, President Bush referred to Kim Jong Il as a “tyrant” after committing the US to a “common approach” to the North Korean nuclear weapons program through “diplomatic means.”
Options Available to the Bush Administration:
- Accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state, like India and Pakistan
- Force regime change through economic sanctions and the inevitable collapse of the existing regime
- Force regime change through surgical preemptive military strike
- Force regime change through massive military invasion
- Negotiations and diplomacy
Dr. Berry’s Recommendations:
Korea was once described as the “land of bad options.” Dr. Berry adamantly asserted that the military options are not
viable. His recommended solution was predicated on combining one threat with the underlying motivations of another. Given that Kim Jong Il does not want to lose power and is assumed to want to acquire nuclear weapons as an insurance policy against attack, convincing him to negotiate away his bargaining chip will require an alleviation of the fears of regime change and military attack. The most successful strategy will be accomplished through diplomacy, negotiations, and economic incentives, such as access to financial assistance from the IMF, World Bank, and
Asian Development Bank. He also recommended a new permanent peace agreement to replace the outdated Korean War Armistice Agreement of 1953. However, he felt that one of the greatest challenges might be in getting the players to the negotiating table, particularly given the rhetoric coming from the top levels of the Bush administration.
Questions Not Asked or Answered
An emergency alarm sounded during the question and answer period requiring an unexpected evacuation and end to the event. Had there been more time, here are a few questions to which I would have liked to have heard his responses:
- Is the permanent possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea an acceptable and expected outcome from a strategic military perspective?
- Can the Bush administration successfully pursue a policy towards North Korea based on both the elimination of nuclear weapons and a regime change, or does one objective compromise the other?
- Which is the more important strategic objective in regards to North Korea, nuclear nonproliferation or regime change?
- Should the US seek stronger diplomatic assistance from other countries? If yes, which countries would be the most important?
- Should the NPT include a provision for military enforcement for noncompliance or would this invariably lead to a nuclear showdown?
- How can international law be strengthened to prevent similar occurrences of nuclear proliferation by other nations?
- In the absence of universal nuclear disarmament, can the world continue to deter nuclear proliferation or will the world see an increase of nuclear weapon states during the next two decades?
Speaker Bio
Dr. William E. Berry, Jr. is a professor of military strategic studies at the US Air Force Academy in Colorado. A career military officer, he retired from the Air Force as a colonel in 1997. During his military career, he served in Vietnam, the Philippines, Korea, and Malaysia. He has written extensively on topics related to U.S. security interests in both northeast and southeast Asia, including the article North Korea’s Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administration’s Response, published by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). His book, U.S. Bases in the Philippines: the Evolution of the Special Relationship, is generally considered to be one of the seminal works on this subject. Dr. Berry’s current research interests include the role of the ASEAN Regional Forum in the accomplishment of American national security interests and the prospects for the U.S.-Korean security relationship after Korean reunification. Dr. Berry earned his Ph.D. from Cornell University.
Additional Resources – Legal
- U.S. and DPRK Agreed Framework (Pact, not a treaty: 21 October 1994)
- Korean War Armistice Agreement (27 July 1953)
- Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) (North Korea withdrew in January 2003)
- Turnkey Contract (TKC) (Implementation of the Agreed Framework)
Additional Resources – Official Sources