NPT RevCon 2005 Ends Without Consensus

The 2005 Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) concluded this week without the adoption of a final resolution, making it the third RevCon to end without some type of consensus since the treaty entered into force in 1970. Only the conferences in 1980 and 1990 also failed to produce final resolutions. While the resolutions are not legally binding, they are considered to be politically important. The divisive issues were the same as the ones first raised thirty years ago at RevCon 1975 and hotly debated ever since. Non-nuclear weapon states worry that nuclear weapon states are not acting in good faith to meet their nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI. Nuclear weapon states want increased safeguards and constraints on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, an “inalienable right” granted to all nations under Article IV. While this year’s RevCon ended with finger-pointing and bold accusations in the media, mainly directed at the United States and Iran, the unofficial conclusion emerging from pundits and nuclear experts is an inevitable return to nuclear proliferation. In fact, Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told journalist Fareed Zakaria in an interview that the world could expect an estimated 15-20 additional states to acquire nuclear weapons programs within the next two decades.

The lack of a final consensus document was not unexpected. The conference began without an agenda because member states could not reach agreement on which substantive issues to discuss and the rules of procedure. (See 5 May 2005 blog post). The United States resisted an agenda that referenced either the RevCon 2000 resolution outcomes or the 13-step plan to nuclear disarmament, which the US agreed to under the Clinton administration. Instead, the US introduced proposals for greater constraints on the peaceful uses of energy by non-nuclear weapon states (Working Paper 57; the document title is mislabeled on the UN website as “Article VI” but it should read “Article IV”) and strengthened procedures for withdrawals from the treaty given in Article X (Working Paper 59). The lack of willingness by nuclear weapon states to discuss disarmament antagonized the non-nuclear weapon states and forced a procedural stalemate for half of the conference, leaving little time to discuss and achieve consensus on substantive issues. Moreover, the United States chose not to send a high level delegation to the conference, as it had done in the past, signifying from the first day a lack of political confidence in the purpose and outcome of the conference.

Working Paper 57 • Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy • Article IV
The US proposal for strengthening Article IV included 20 recommended statements for inclusion in the final conference resolution. Some of the recommendations reflected typical diplomatic, mellifluous statements, such as recognizing “the valuable contribution the NPT has made” and the responsibility of nations for “full compliance with their relevant obligations.” However, the proposal went on to constrain the expectation of “full compliance” solely to Articles I-IV as related to peaceful nuclear programs (#3), and it introduced a ban on the development and completion of fuel cycle production facilities by states currently without such facilities (#16). This ban was perceived by some non-nuclear weapon states as a strategic maneuver by the United States to place the “have nots” at a perpetual security and economic disadvantage. Without advanced fuel cycle production facilities, non-nuclear weapon states would be reliant on the Big-5 nuclear fuel suppliers for the pricing and availability of a nuclear fuel commodity vital to the critical state function of domestic energy production. In some countries, such as Lithuania, Ukraine, Sweden, and Belgium, more than 40% of the total energy production comes from nuclear power. A sudden price increase or unavailability of supply could dramatically affect their domestic economies. Adding to the concern, the US proposal stressed the point that Article IV does not require the transfer of nuclear material; it is a voluntary action subject to approval or denial as determined by each nuclear supplier state, not the recipient (#11).

Argentina spoke in strong opposition to additional constraints under Article IV due to the far-reaching implications for future technologies: “In reality, this right falls within the framework of an unquestionable general right to technological development, except where relinquished by agreement, which, in the case of the Treaty, is limited to nuclear weapons.”

Critics of Argentina’s viewpoint warn that a state could develop the production capabilities to create a nuclear weapon and, as long as that state did not actually create one, could remain within the legal compliance requirements of the treaty. This scenario could result in the proliferation of “near-nuke” states on the momentous brink of producing and using a nuclear bomb. In essence, the world would become less safe through an increase of nuclear production-capable states.
Given that the treaty does not currently sanction or penalize countries from withdrawing, a nation could develop the capacity to create a nuclear bomb, receive the nuclear technology import benefits of treaty compliance, and then abruptly decide to withdraw and announce a nuclear weapons program, all within the boundaries of existing international law. North Korea set the example in 2003 when it withdrew from the treaty without recourse then later announced, denied, and announced again in February 2005 its nuclear weapons program.

This scenario highlights the considerable difficulty international treaties face in trying to be detailed yet not encyclopedic and in anticipating future technological possibilities. Argentina interprets the treaty’s definitions of “peaceful uses,” “inalienable right,” and “nuclear weapon” to be strictly detailed and absolute. In Argentina’s viewpoint, since advanced research reactors and nuclear fuel cycle production facilities are not “nuclear weapons,” they remain the fundamental right of all nations to posses, even if they can result in the clandestine production of nuclear weapons. Other countries, such as the Republic of Korea (South Korea), perceive the rights of Article IV as open to limitations and accountable to the spirit of the treaty to achieve global security and nonproliferation. One compromise between the positions of the US and Argentina arose in the Republic of Korea’s proposal for commitments from non-nuclear states to forego voluntarily production facilities in return for “secure guarantees for fuel supply at a reasonable price” (Working Paper 47). South Korea is the world’s sixth-largest civil nuclear industry and relies on nuclear energy for more than 40% of its energy production.

Report 9 • Nuclear Disarmament • Article VI • CTBT
Austria, on behalf of ten countries, submitted a two-page paper (Report 9) on Article V and VI to Main Committee I and III detailing the importance and need for ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The treaty represents the first step of the 13-point plan to complete and irreversible nuclear disarmament adopted at RevCon 2000. No reference was made to nuclear disarmament, the “principle of irreversibility”, nonproliferation, or any of the other 12 steps of the plan.

The term “Comprehensive” is used to represent and define a complete ban on any nuclear explosions, including nuclear testing. Previously, the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty, also known as the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the Limited Test-Ban Treaty, forbid the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, but nations could still conduct underground testing.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty opened for signatures nine years ago on 24 September 1996 and still has not entered into force. To date, 175 countries have signed the CTBT and 120 countries have ratified it. The treaty cannot enter into force until the remaining eleven of 44 nuclear states listed in the treaty’s Annex 2 ratify it. To be included in Annex 2, a state must possess one or more nuclear power or research reactors. The remaining eleven states include: China, Colombia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, United States, and Vietnam. These states participated in the 1996 United Nations Conference on Disarmament, which concluded with the adoption of the CTBT by the UN General Assembly on a vote of 158-3 (Bhutan, India and Libya), with 5 abstentions (Cuba, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria and the United Republic of Tanzania). The UN will be encouraging additional ratifications of the CTBT at its annual treaty event in September 2005 as part of the Millenium+5 Summit.

The United States signed the CTBT on the first day it opened for signatures and has not yet ratified it. According to the US Department of State, the US is reluctant to ratify the treaty if it compromises the ability to verify the safety, reliability, and functional deterrence of nuclear weapons under its Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Working Paper 59 • Withdrawal from the Treaty • Article X
The US proposal for strengthening Article X was introduced in response to the first and only withdrawal from the treaty to date, which occurred since the last RevCon. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) legally withdrew in January 2003 without penalties, sanctions, or an immediate meeting of member states. The US proposal recommended ten statements for inclusion in the final resolution. The statements strongly encourage member states to: “engage in consultations, prior to withdrawal” (#1) and “state clearly the extraordinary circumstances” leading to the withdrawal (#3). Upon notification of a state’s intent to withdrawal, the UN Security Council would be asked to meet to address the situation and if necessary, engage the state in dialogue (#4). Failure to resolve by dialogue would not relieve states of their accountability for treaty violations made as a member state (#5) and would subject the state to potential action (#6-10). The statements were written to allow broad interpretation of the “wide range of
actions” mentioned in the document. No references to economic sanctions or military actions were made.

In the absence of stronger enforcement measures, Article X continues to allow countries to abandon the treaty to pursue nuclear weapon programs without recourse.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
Cuba submitted a paper titled, “Proliferation security initiative: legal consequences from the standpoint of international law” (Working Paper 26). The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a United States initiative introduced by President Bush on 31 May 2003. The US claims the PSI is not a “treaty” and does not create formal “obligations.” Likewise, it is asserted membership does not confer status as part of an “organization.” Rather, member states participate in an “activity.” In the paper, Cuba outlined objections to the pre-emptive strike policy insinuated in the PSI, its implications on the definition of state sovereignty, and the role of the PSI in weakening international law. Moreover, Cuba expressed concern that implementation of some PSI actions could violate international laws, such as the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Note: the official PSI overview page was updated 26 May 2005 and moved to a new location (see also the previous page).

Doomsday Clock • Minutes to Midnight
The Board of Directors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has maintained a “Doomsday Clock” since 1947 to symbolize the level of nuclear danger in the world. The clock’s initial time was set at seven minutes to midnight. The directors advance or turn back the clock in relation to positive and negative developments in nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and international events. The time reached as low as two minutes in 1953 with the testing of thermonuclear devices by the United States and Russia and as high as seventeen minutes with the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). When the U.S. Senate ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969, the clock clicked back three minutes, from seven to ten minutes to midnight.

The current clock time, set in 2002, stands at seven minutes to midnight, having advanced for the third time since 1991. The positive developments related to the NPT in 2000 helped persuade the Board of Directors not to advance the clock even further.

With the limited progress of RevCon 2005, will the clock advance forward once again? If so, will it be closer to midnight than ever before? What actions can the world pursue to turn back the clock and ease the ominous sense of foreboding?

Factors influencing an advance of the clock:

• NPT RevCon ends without a final consensus (2005)
• North Korea announces a nuclear weapons program (2005)
• US Department of Defense pursues funding for new nuclear weapons and nuclear testing preparations (2005)
• IAEA reports Iran’s violations of the NPT treaty (2004)
• A.Q. Khan and his network sell nuclear weapons materials to Iran and North Korea (2004)
• South Korea announces past clandestine uranium enrichment attempts in violation of the NPT (2004)
• North Korea becomes the first member state to withdraw from the NPT (2003)

Factors influencing the clock to click back:

• Strengthening of international laws
• Additional signatures and ratifications of the existing 22 international treaties related to terrorism (see list below)
• Widespread participation in the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism which opens for signatures in September 2005 (see blog post 19 April 2005)
• Entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty
• Adoption of Protocols to strengthen the NPT
• Universal adoption of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol
• Modification of existing treaties to include “non-state” nuclear violators
• Increased nuclear energy safeguards
• Additional monitoring in civilian and military nuclear programs of the precursor steps towards building a nuclear weapon
• Greater oversight and regulation of civilian research reactors
• Confidence-building commitments
• Agreements by North Korea and Iran not to purse nuclear weapons programs
• Return of North Korea to the NPT
• Explicit commitments by nuclear weapon states, including those not party to the NPT, not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons on non-nuclear states
• Universal commitment by governments to nuclear disarmament or, in the absence of disarmament, commitment to reductions in nuclear forces
• Increased public awareness and education of nuclear weapon threats
• An annual NPT conference to help build confidence in the treaty and to address violations, concerns, and incidents in a timely manner

Background on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

• Entry into Force – 5 March 1970

• Goals – The main goals of the treaty include the
prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the ultimate
disarmament of all nuclear weapons worldwide. The treaty is the only
multilateral treaty to obligate nuclear weapon states to disarm. The “three pillars” frequently mentioned in relation to the NPT include: 1) disarmament, 2) verification of safeguards on national nuclear programs and 3) the peaceful use of atomic energy.

• Parties to the Treaty – All UN member states, with
the exception of India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, are party to
the treaty. North Korea withdrew in 2003 without recourse since there
is no penalty for withdrawal specified by the treaty. Non-nuclear Cuba
is also not a party to the treaty. The treaty narrowly defines nuclear
weapon states to be only those five states with nuclear capabilities
prior to 1 January 1967: the United States, the United Kingdom, China,
France, and Russia. The treaty legally binds these nuclear weapon
states to nuclear disarmament. India, Pakistan, and Israel would need
to demonstrate nuclear disarmament before acceding to the treaty.

• Review Conference –
The Review Conference is held every five years, as specified in the treaty (Article VIII (3)). The conference is advisory.

Resources on Nuclear Arms Control

2005 NPT Review Conference

• 2005 NPT RevCon Conference Documents
• 2005 NPT RevCon Preparatory Committee First Session Documents (PrepCom 1) (2002)
• 2005 NPT RevCon Preparatory Committee Second Session Documents (PrepCom 2) (2003)
• 2005 NPT RevCon Preparatory Committee Third Session Documents (PrepCom 3) (2004)

Previous NPT Review Conferences

• 2000 NPT RevCon Final Document
• 1995 NPT RevCon Final Decisions and Resolution

Additional Resources – Nuclear Treaties

United Nations

• UN and Disarmament
• UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (28 April 2004)
• International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on nuclear weapons (8 July 1996)
• International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on nuclear weapons (4 November 1999)
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
• International Maritime Organization (IMO)

Additional Resources – Organizations

• Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
  Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)
• Arms Control Association
• ArmsControlWonk.com Blog
• Campaign to Strengthen the NPT (Arms Control Association and the Carnegie Endowment)
• Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP)
• Nuclear Control Institute (NCI)
• Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)