Iranian Interior Minister Ousted for Fake Law Degree
Iran’s parliament, known as the Malijis of Iran or Islamic Consultative Assembly, impeached Interior Minister Ali Kordan under Article 89 of the Iranian Constitution for forging an honorary doctorate degree in law from Oxford University. The forged Ph.D. diploma, complete with spelling and grammatical errors, was purportedly granted for his “education materials and his research” in comparative law. Oxford University confirmed that no honorary degree was awarded and that the diploma is not authentic. Mr. Kordan became the 10th Minister to be replaced. The Iranian Constitution requires the President to resubmit all cabinet members in the Council of Ministers to the Assembly for approval if more than half of the 21 cabinet ministers are replaced. Thus, the next replacement, either voluntarily by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or through parliamentary action, will trigger this constitutional requirement under Article 136 to require “a fresh vote of confidence from the Assembly” for the entire cabinet.
The Assembly impeached Mr. Kordan by 188 votes in favor, 45 against, and 14 abstentions. Thus, there were 247 votes total out of the 290-member Assembly.
Was the impeachment under Article 89 lawful?
President Ahmadinejad argued that the trigger for impeachment under Article 89 should be whether the Minister’s job performance is unsatisfactory. In rebuttal, Assembly member Ali Motahari argued on the floor during the impeachment motion that parliament had trusted Mr. Kondan’s academic credentials when it gave the original vote of confidence. Thus, he argues that the Assembly was within its constitutional limits to conduct an investigative hearing into those credentials and to impeach the Minister upon a finding that the degree was a forgery.
The constitutional threshold for bringing the impeachment session is 10 signatures, after which the respondent has 10 days to prepare and provide a response on the floor of the Assembly.
(1) Members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly can interpellate the Council of Ministers or an individual Minister in instances they deem necessary. Interpellations can be tabled if they bear the signatures of at least ten members. The Council of Ministers or interpellated Minister must be present in the Assembly within ten days after the tabling of the interpellation in order to answer it and seek a vote of confidence. If the Council of Ministers or the Minister concerned fails to attend the Assembly, the members who tabled the interpellation will explain their reasons, and the Assembly will declare a vote of no confidence if it deems it necessary. If the Assembly does not pronounce a vote of confidence, the Council of Ministers or the Minister subject to interpellation is dismissed. In both cases, the Ministers subject to interpellation cannot become members of the next Council of Ministers formed immediately afterwards.
(2) In the event at least one-third of the members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly interpellate the President concerning his executive responsibilities in relation with the Executive Power and the executive affairs of the country the President must be present in the Assembly within one month after the tabling of the interpellation in order to give adequate explanations in regard to the matters raised. In the event, after hearing the statements of the opposing and favoring members and the reply of the President, two-thirds of the members of the Assembly declare a vote of no confidence, the same will be communicated to the Leadership for information and implementation of Article 110 (10).
Was the restriction on who in government could attend the impeachment proceedings in open session of the Assembly lawful?
According to an Iranian press report, the Assembly restricted the number and type of government officials who could attend its “open” impeachment session of Mr. Kordan. The officials allowed to attend included: the president, vice-presidents, ministers and their parliamentary deputies. Other government officials were relegated to the viewing areas in other portions of the building.
President Ahmadinejad did not attend the impeachment session, maintaining his position that it was illegal.
What’s next for President Ahmadinejad?
The Iranian Constitution requires the President to resubmit his entire cabinet for a vote of confidence if “half of the members of the Council of Ministers are changed.” U.S. news agencies, such as the Washington Post, are using the term “more than half,” but technically, the requirement is “half,” not “more than half.” Mathematically, half of 21 Ministers equals 10.5 Ministers. Pragmatically, this means that the terms “half” and “more than half” yield the same result of the 11th Minister being the trigger. Should the total number of cabinet ministers become an even amount in the future, it is unclear which interpretation would be applied by the Assembly and/or by the President.
Initially, there was some confusion in U.S. media over how many dismissals were required.
For example, The New York Times initially incorrectly reported on November 4, 2008 that “[t]he dismissal means that Mr. Ahmadinejad must now submit his whole cabinet to a vote of confidence before Parliament. According to the rules of the country’s Constitution, if 10 cabinet members are dismissed, all members must face a confidence vote, and in the past three years Mr. Ahmadinejad had already dismissed nine cabinet members because they disagreed with his policies.” The NYT has since corrected the version online of the story to reflect that the 11th cabinet dismissal will trigger this requirement: “Dismissal Is Setback for Iran’s Leader.
The President can dismiss the Ministers and in such a case he must obtain a vote of confidence for the new Minister(s) from the Assembly. In case half of the members of the Council of Ministers are changed after the government has received its vote of confidence from the Assembly, the government must seek a fresh vote of confidence from the Assembly.
What’s next for President Ahmadinejad?
Prior to Kordan’s impeachment and dismissal from office, President Ahmadinejad already had dismissed 9 Ministers for political disagreements. Now, with the threshold as low as 10 signatures of the 290-member Assembly required to initiate an impeachment session, and the Assembly holding the power to play the last political card of an 11th dismissal, President Ahmadinejad faces increased domestic threats to his grip on power. Similarly, this domestic threat weakens his international profile and raises serious questions about his reelection next summer unless he is able to strengthen his relationships with his citizens and with allies in parliament. Does President Ahmadinejad see this move by parliament as favoring the public perception that he is breaking free from the traditionalists and that the traditionalists are merely seeking retribution through attacks on his cabinet?
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran